Bondi and the Politics of Firearms 

By Rachael Oxborrow 

Reforms introduced after the Bondi terrorist attack were supposed to reduce the number of firearms in the community. Instead, they appear to have achieved exactly the opposite. Rather than reducing demand, they triggered a surge in firearm licence applications, as licensed shooters looked for lawful ways to restructure firearm ownership before proposed ownership caps took effect. 

In New South Wales, firearms licence applications increased by almost 50 per cent and applications for the collector licence category, which is not subject to the proposed ownership limits, reportedly increased by about 7,000 per cent within weeks. In the ACT, licence applications also increased sharply yet Permits to Acquire firearms did not. Police concluded the increase was largely driven by additional family members becoming licensed for firearms already in circulation. 

That outcome should surprise anyone. Laws built on the assumption that people who obey existing firearms laws will simply own fewer firearms, ignore a basic reality. Law-abiding people adapt to the rules governments create and criminals, by their very nature, do not. 

Before deciding whether these reforms are the right response, it is worth asking a more fundamental question. What evidence is there that simply reducing the number of legally owned firearms will improve public safety? 

Australians have a long history of firearm ownership for primary production, pest animal control, recreational hunting and target shooting. Today, there are more than four million legally owned firearms held by just more than 900,000 licensed firearm owners. 

Those figures are often presented as evidence that Australia is becoming less safe. The long-term data suggests otherwise. As lawful firearm ownership has increased, firearm homicide, firearm suicide and armed robbery involving firearms have all continued to decline. That does not prove there is no relationship between firearm ownership and public safety, but it does demonstrate that the relationship is far more complex than simply counting the number of legally owned firearms. 

These figures were released by the Department of Home Affairs alongside the Albanese Government’s announcement of a National Gun Buyback and nationally consistent reforms, including ownership caps, restrictions on so called open-ended licences, Australian citizenship requirements, accelerated implementation of the National Firearms Register and greater use of criminal intelligence in firearms licensing decisions. 

If Australia’s firearm safety outcomes have continued to improve while lawful ownership has increased, what evidence demonstrates that simply reducing the number of legally owned firearms will produce further improvements? 

The Bondi attack also exposed a more important issue than the number of firearms in private hands. If Australia already has one of the world’s most comprehensive firearms licensing systems, how were the perpetrators able to gain access to firearms in the first place? That question goes to the heart of whether the current reforms are addressing the problem they seek to solve. If intelligence sharing, licensing decisions or risk assessment processes fail to identify or respond to a genuine threat, then strengthening those systems should be the priority. 

Introducing additional restrictions on hundreds of thousands of Australians who have already demonstrated their suitability to hold a firearms licence does little to explain how those existing safeguards failed. Australia’s own law enforcement and criminology agencies make a similar distinction. The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission’s (ACIC) Illicit Firearms in Australia report identifies organised crime groups, outlaw motorcycle gangs, drug traffickers and extremist networks as the principal users of illicit firearms. It acknowledges significant gaps in Australia’s understanding of the illicit firearms market and identifies theft, illegal importation, illicit manufacture and legacy grey-market firearms as the principal pathways through which firearms become illicit. What it does not conclude is that increasing numbers of lawfully owned firearms are, in themselves, driving criminal firearm use. 

The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) reaches a similar conclusion. Its research consistently shows that those responsible for serious firearm offending are fundamentally different from Australia’s licensed firearms community. The AIC’s National Homicide Monitoring Program found that almost nine in ten offenders who committed homicide with a handgun were not licensed firearm owners, while 98 per cent were using unregistered handguns. Those findings reinforce an important distinction in Australia’s firearms debate. The overwhelming majority of those responsible for the most serious firearm offences were already operating outside Australia’s firearms licensing and registration system. 

State governments have also taken different approaches. Victoria rejected the proposed ownership cap while supporting stronger action against trafficking, illegal firearms and organised crime. Queensland strengthened Firearm Prohibition Orders, expanded the use of criminal intelligence and introduced additional mental health reporting. Western Australia had already implemented extensive limitations before Bondi, including ownership caps, expanded police powers and stronger licence disqualification provisions. Even among governments committed to stronger firearms laws, there is no universal agreement that reducing the number of legally owned firearms is the reform most likely to improve public safety. 

None of this is an argument against firearms regulation, rather using regulation as a direct reaction to a tragic event where firearms are used. Australia’s licensing system, registration requirements, secure storage laws and ongoing suitability assessments all play an important role in protecting the community. The question is whether future reforms should focus on counting firearms or identifying risks. 

If Bondi demonstrated anything, it was that systems designed to identify dangerous individuals must work better. Intelligence must be shared more effectively, and licensing authorities must have access to timely information. Police must be able to intervene when genuine risks emerge, and any reforms must be directed at the people most likely to cause harm. 

Good public policy should be driven by evidence rather than perception, and it should address demonstrated failures rather than assumed ones and focus on the behaviour that creates risk rather than on the people who already comply with the law. If the lasting legacy of Bondi is simply fewer firearms owned by licensed Australians, while the systemic failures that allowed the attack to occur remain unresolved, Australia risks learning the wrong lesson. 

Jurisdiction	Trend figure
ACT	Applications rose from about 137 per month to 188 per month after Dec 2025. Police indicated permits to acquire had not increased, suggesting firearms were being distributed among licensed family members.
Northern Territory	Not committed to buyback in current form.
NSW	Applications up nearly 50% with an average of 2,437 per month from Jan-Mar 2026 compared to 1,670 per month Apr-Dec 2025.
Queensland	Rejected most elements of the buyback. Strengthened Firearm Prohibition Orders, intelligence and mental health reporting.
South Australia	Not committed to buyback in current form.
Tasmania	The state government has backflipped on buybacks and caps and final outcomes are yet to be agreed upon.
Victoria	Rejected the proposed firearm ownership cap. Premier Jacinta Allan saying focus needs to be on criminals and illegal firearms. Reforms related to trafficking, licensing, police powers and intelligence accepted.
Western Australia	Reforms in place before Bondi attack, including ownership caps, police powers, licence disqualification and citizen requirement.